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In the present grid real time control systems are the energy management systems and distribution 
management systems that utilize measurements from real-time units (RTUs) and Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). The SCADA systems are designed to operate on 
isolated, private networks without even basic security features which are now being migrated to 
modern IP-based communications providing near real time information from measuring and 
controlling units. To function “brain” (SCADA) properly “heart” (RTUs) should provide 
necessary response thereby creating a coupling which makes SCADA systems as targets for 
cyber-attacks to cripple either part of the electric transmission grid or fully shut down (create 
blackout) the grid.  Cyber-security research for a distribution grid is a topic yet to be addressed. 
To date firewalls and classic signature-based intrusion detection systems have provided access 
control and awareness of suspicious network traffic but typically have not offered any real-time 
detection and defense solutions for electric distribution grids. 
This thesis work not only addresses the cyber security modeling, detection and prevention but 
also addresses model inconsistencies for effectively utilizing and controlling distribution 
management systems. Inconsistencies in the electrical design parameters of the distribution 
network or cyber-attack conditions may result in failing of the automated operations or 
distribution state estimation process which might lead the system to a catastrophic condition or 
give erroneous solutions for the probable problems. This research work also develops a robust 
and reliable voltage controller based on Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) to maintain the 
voltage profile in a smart distribution system under cyber-attacks and model inconsistencies. The 
developed cyber-attack detection and mitigation algorithms have been tested on IEEE 13 node 
and 600+ node real American electric distribution systems modeled in Electric Power Research 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The electric power system consists of three fields- generation, transmission and 
distribution; which are constantly evolving to supply the ever increasing demand in a more cost 
effective, efficient and reliable manner, both for the utilities and the customers. For this purpose 
the electric power grid has become the most complex and highly invested industry undergoing 
constant technological renovations. These technological advancements led to the concepts of 
SCADA, Energy Management systems (EMS), Distribution System Management (DMS), Smart 
Grid and Distribution Automation (DA) in the power grid.  
1.2 Smart Grid  
The concept of a smart grid started with the formation of Independent System Operator (ISO) 
and Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) under the recommendation of Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). The ISOs and RTOs are formed to make a smarter electrical 
grid keeping in mind the demands of the 21
st
 century. The US Department of Energy (DOE) 
defines the overall vision of Smart Grid as the following [1]. 
1. Intelligent Automation– having sensors to sense overload conditions and rerouting power 
and avoiding outage conditions; automatic isolation of faulted areas with minimum 
disruption of power.  
 
2. Smooth Integration of Distributed Generation (DG) – integration of any fuel source 
including solar and wind as easily and transparently as coal and natural gas; also other 
technologies like energy storage. 
 
3. Sophisticated Demand Response Capabilities – supporting real-time communication 
between the consumer and utility so consumers can alter their energy consumption based 




4. Quality-centric – capable of delivering the power which is free of sags, spikes, 
disturbances and interruptions.  
 
5. Robust – highly resistant to cyber-attack and natural disasters as it becomes more 
decentralized. 
There are vast benefits to the country with the commencement of Smart Grid [2]. The chances of 
cascading outages and dependency on foreign fuel are reduced. One of the important objectives 
of smart grid concept is to allow high penetration of DG and new storage technologies into the 
present grid smoothly.  DGs are small scale power generation technologies located close to the 
load having capabilities of lowering costs, improving reliability and reducing emissions.  
1.3 Distributed generation 
With the advent of smart grid and advancement of new technologies, the utilities are focused 
towards adding DG into their existing infrastructure. The addition of DG does bring along 
different technological and environmental benefits to the power grid like locally fulfilling the 
consumer demands, reducing power losses and avoiding transmission and distribution system 
expansion [3]. Earlier conventional power sources were used for these purposes but in the last 
few years, renewable energy has taken their place as a feasible future source of electric energy as 
they can eradicate the problems of increasing consumer demand, fluctuating fossil fuel prices 
and also solve problems related to environmental issues. The prevalent forms of DG are wind 
power, solar photovoltaic, fuel cells and micro-turbines. The DGs that are of electromechanical 
type could be directly interfaced whereas other DGs require inverter based systems to connect to 
the power grid.  
 
Although there are many advantages of integrating DGs into the grid there are some negative 
impacts too. The integration of DGs changes the unidirectional power flow of a traditional radial 
distribution network to a two-way power flow because of the addition of generators in the 
distribution side [4]. This also affects the traditional relays and protection devices as they 
generally do not have directional capabilities. The power quality can also be affected as DG 
devices are connected to the power grid by power electronic devices which might cause 
distortion of the current and voltage waveforms and induce harmonics [5]. 
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1.3.1 Photovoltaic Systems 
Solar energy is the world’s most copiously available form of renewable energy source and so 
photovoltaic generators are one of the fastest emerging DG technologies, with an estimate annual 
growth rate of 25-35% in the power market [1]. The reason for this remarkable growth in spite of 
their high installation cost can be given to the advancements in power electronics field, storage 
devices, etc. which are highly essential for large scale installation of PV generators at 
distribution side. Moreover PV generators are vigorously being endorsed in order to alleviate 
environmental issues such as the greenhouse effect and air pollution and also they help in 
relieving thermal overloads and reducing losses in distribution systems [6-7]. Another advantage 
is that solar technology is very flexible and can be easily changed to provide the required power 
for different loads. The energy produced by the PV system reduces the apparent load whereas the 
surplus energy flows into the grid. But one drawback that these solar generators cause when they 
installed near to the load side owing to their intermittent nature even after so much effort has 
been done to get an accurate estimate of the daily solar generation curve is that they disturb the 
voltage profile of the distribution system. 
 
1.4 Voltage Control 
The simplest voltage control methods in a distribution system use local measurements for 
maintaining the voltage profile and data transfer between the distribution nodes is not required. 
On the contrary, there are methods that require data transfer between the distribution nodes and 
they determine their control actions based on the information of the entire distribution network. 
These methods are known as coordinated voltage control methods. A variety of coordinated or 
centralized voltage controls methods have been developed in distribution systems with different 
levels of effectiveness, complexity, communications requirements, and cost effectiveness. 
Centralized Distribution Management System (DMS) control and also coordination of 
distribution network components such as OLTC, voltage regulators, DGs and switched capacitor 
control are some of the examples of coordinated voltage management for distribution systems. 
Figure 1 show the different elements employed in a distribution system for the purpose of 





Figure 1 Voltage Control in Distribution System 
 
1.4.1 OLTC 
A tap changer is a device for regulation of the output voltage to required levels fitted to power 
transformers. This is typically achieved by altering the ratios of the transformers on the system 
by varying the number of turns in one winding of the suitable transformer/s. Tap changers offer 
flexible control to keep the voltage supply within the limits. Tap changers can be either on load 
or off load. On load tap changers transfer current from one voltage tap to the next without 
interrupting the supply. Tap changers can be adjusted to fit the application requirements. 
1.4.2 Voltage Regulators 
A voltage regulator is a device used to automatically maintain a constant voltage level in electric 
power distribution system. It may be installed at a substation or along distribution lines so that all 
customers receive steady voltage without worrying about how much power is drawn from the 
line. Generally voltage regulators have capability of raising or lowering the voltage by 10%.  
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1.4.3 Switched Capacitors 
The main use of shunt capacitor banks (SCB) is to provide capacitive reactive compensation or 
power factor correction. The reason for increased use of SCBs is their inexpensiveness, easy and 
quick installation and easy deployment almost anywhere in the network. Other valuable effects 
of its installation on the distribution system are: improvement of the voltage at the load, 
improved voltage regulation, reduction of losses and cost savings due to delay of investments in 
transmission system. 
1.5 Cyber Attack in Power System 
The numerous technological advancements and increasing demand for reliable energy have 
stimulated the development of a smart grid. The smart grid is supposed to expand the present 
capabilities of the power grid’s generation, transmission and distribution systems to support the 
requirements of distributed generation, renewable energy resources, electric vehicles and 
demand-side management of power. 
The present distribution system will see the advent of advanced technologies such as phasor 
measurement units (PMU), wide area measurement systems, substation automation, and 
advanced metering infrastructures (AMI) to realize these objectives. But their introduction to the 
distribution side also presents an increased reliance on cyber resources which may be susceptible 
to attack conditions. Moreover, power grid in the past decade has encountered numerous cyber 
related attacks which have elevated the interrogation regarding the security susceptibilities and 
its large scale impact on the critical power grid infrastructure [8-12]. The cyber-physical 




Figure 2 Power Grid Cyber-Physical Infrastructure [13] 
 
The different types of attacks that can affect the normal operation of a power distribution system 
as described in [14] are:- 
1) Denial of Cooperative Operation (DoS): In this attack, the communication channels are 
jammed by flooding them with junk packets which can result in loss of important data and might 
affect the automated control operations. 
 
2) Desynchronization attacks: In this attack, the control algorithms of automated operation which 
are time dependent are attacked. 
 
3) Data Injection Attacks: In this attack, false operational data such as status or control 
information are send that can significantly affect the operations of a power grid. This type of 







1.6  Problem Statement 
The primary objective of this thesis is to develop a robust and reliable voltage controller based 
on multiple linear regressions to maintain the voltage profile in a distribution system with 
distributed generators (DG) connected to it. Regression is based on least squares method making 
use of data acquired from exact simulations of the distribution network. The independent 
variables selected for this study are active power output of DG, total load and var injection at the 
capacitor bank as independent variables whereas the dependent variable is per unit voltage at the 
violating buses. The proposed controller is validated on IEEE 13 bus distribution system and 
American Electric Power System feeder modeled in OpenDSS. 
This thesis also models two different types of attack, namely data integrity attack on the voltage 
control loop and load redistribution attack and also inconsistencies in electrical design parameter 
in a power distribution network. A regression based distributed detection algorithm having local 
detection agents is developed for detection of cyber-attack in a distribution system with DG 
connected to it. An algorithm is proposed to select a certain number of buses in the system to be 
declared as elected buses and linear regression based local agents are developed from the elected 
buses. The cyber-attacks and detection technique are developed in AEP feeder modeled in 
OpenDSS.  
This thesis also validates the effectiveness of the proposed voltage controller strategy against 
data integrity attack on voltage control loop, load redistribution attack and inconsistencies in 
electrical design parameter in a power distribution network which are modeled in AEP 
Distribution feeder.  
The effect of inconsistency in electrical design parameter in calculation of the line losses for 
overhead lines in AEP Feeder without any DG is presented. The parameter considered for 
modeling this inconsistency is line reactance which is modeled in OpenDSS. 
A few assumptions made in this thesis work are listed below, 
• Voltage regulators are turned off in both IEEE 13 bus distribution system and AEP feeder 
for all the proposed strategies. 
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• Data sets for the independent variables and dependent variables for the regression are 
taken from the exact simulation of the distribution system in OpenDSS. 
1.7 Approach 
The sections to follow will develop voltage controller model, cyber-attacks and distributed 
cyber- attack detection technique. The key aspects of this research are highlighted in subsections 
below. 
1.7.1 Voltage Controller Strategy 
Integration of DG to a distribution system and the changing load conditions impact voltage 
profile in a distribution system. So their affect should be taken into account while developing a 
strategy for voltage regulation in a distribution system.  
• Exact models of the distribution systems are modeled in OpenDSS for the analysis. 
• Multiple linear regression is done in Minitab with per unit voltage at violating buses as 
dependent variables and active power output of DG, total load and var injection form the 
capacitor bank as independent variables. 
• Data sets for the dependent and independent variables are generated from OpenDSS 
using random network and loading conditions. 
• Optimum var settings for capacitor banks are calculated in Matlab using the regression 
models of per unit voltage of violating buses. 
1.7.2 Cyber Attack Detection Algorithm 
An agent based detection technique for cyber-attacks is developed based on linear regression. 
This technique can be effectively used until the topology of the distribution system changes and 
can detect different types of attacks, namely data integrity attack on voltage control loop and 
load redistribution attack.  
• Exact models of the distribution systems are modeled in OpenDSS for the analysis. 
• Cyber-attacks are modeled in OpenDSS in the exact model itself. 
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• A distributed algorithm using local agents based on linear regression is developed for the 
detection of the cyber-attacks. The linear regression analyses in done in Minitab software. 
• The detection technique is tested for different cases of cyber-attacks in AEP feeder. 
1.7.3 Electrical Design Parameters Inconsistency effect on Losses Calculation 
The effect of inconsistency in electrical design parameter in calculation of the line losses for 
overhead lines in AEP Feeder without any DG is presented. The parameter considered for 
modeling this inconsistency is line reactance which is modeled in OpenDSS. 
• The AEP feeder 1 is studied thoroughly and all the different conductor type lines are 
identified. 
• The different types of geometries used for all the different types of lines are identified in 
the AEP feeder 1. 
• Losses for a few maximum losses giving lines of a 2 conductor type line and 4 conductor 
type line are calculated with all the identified geometries for those types of lines including their 
original geometry. 
• The effect of different types of geometries on different types of lines is analyzed. 
1.8 Outline 
The outline of the remaining chapters is given in this section. 
Chapter 2 is a comprehensive literature review on voltage control in distribution system using 
voltage regulators, OLTC, capacitor banks, DGs or a combination of any of these. A literature 
review on the different cyber-attacks in power system is also discussed in details.  
Chapter 3 is about mathematical formulation of multiple linear regression technique, modeling of 
the inconsistencies in the electric design parameters, data integrity attack on voltage control loop 
and load redistribution attack in a distribution system. The voltage controller strategy and cyber-
attack detection technique is also formulated. 
Chapter 4 gives a comprehensive description of the software packages used in this study. The 
advantages presented by the software to the pertinent applications are also discussed. 
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Chapter 5 presents the test systems, simulations for voltage control strategy and associated 
regression models and the cyber-attack detection technique and the associated regression models. 
The effect of the cyber-attacks on voltage control in a distribution system is also presented. 




















Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the literature for voltage control using capacitor banks, OLTC, 
voltage regulators and DG. Also deception attack and load distribution attack in power systems. 
2.1 Voltage Control in distribution system  
Different strategies exist in the present distribution system which can be used by DMS or DA to 
counter the voltage instability like regulator control using different tap settings, capacitor control 
supplying/ absorbing Kvar to/from the distribution system, etc. Capacitor control is usually done 
to achieve the following goals: reduce losses due to reactive load current, reduce kVA demand, 
decrease customer energy consumption, improve voltage profile, and increase revenue.   
 A lot of research has been done on the use of capacitor control, both in offline and online mode 
to maintain the voltage profile in a distribution system. Reference [15] discussed about the 
traditional capacitor bank control strategies which mainly employed timers, voltage controls, and 
voltage with time bias; their advantages and drawbacks. Also some improved capacitor control 
technologies like Fisher Pierce Current Control, Beckwith Electric Co. Inc., RTE Combinational 
Capacitor Control and lastly proposed an exhaustive search methodology for determining the 
optimum set points for the capacitor bank switching. 
A control strategy for the control of both voltage and reactive power at distribution substation 
and feeder level using an optimization method involving minimizing the sum of weighted 
squares of the set points values for all the variables that need to be controlled is proposed in [16]. 
The variables chosen to be controlled for this study are voltage, reactive power and feeder losses. 
Reference [17] provides the optimum placement, replacement and control of capacitors in 
distribution systems using a two stage algorithm; one stage being Genetic Algorithm to find 
neighbourhoods of high quality solutions and the second stage is for improving the solution 
given by first stage. Reference [19] proposes solutions for the problems of optimal location, type, 
and size of the capacitors in a radial distribution system taking voltage constraints and load 
variations in the optimization problem. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer linear 
programming problem.  
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Reference [22] presents the problem formulation, solution methodology and mathematical 
validation of a novel capacitor placement and their real time control schemes in an unbalanced 
distribution system. The problem is divided into two subproblems, first the capacitor placement 
and second the real time control. The approach of quadratic integer programming is used which 
yielded the optimum number, location and size of capacitor to be installed in the system. The 
numerical studies for this are presented in [23]. 
The maintenance of voltage profile at every customer’s meter within the ANSI standards using 
step up voltage regulators is shown in [18]. The regulators are considered as tap-changing 
autotransformers. Reference [20] provides control of the local regulating devices in a distribution 
substations and feeders taking dynamically changing system conditions into account instead of 
the local measurements. 
The problem of minimizing the real power losses and enhancing the voltage profile in a 
distribution system is solved using a reconfiguration methodology built on a new adaptive 
imperialist competitive algorithm in [21]. 
Distributed capacitor control methodologies to regulate voltage profile in a distribution system 
are performed in [24-25] in which the whole network is divided into different control zones 
based on reactive power area of each governable shunt capacitor and finding the optimal setting 
point for each zone. The figure 3 shows how the areas are divided based on reactive power 
domains. 
Reference [26] provides an optimal vol/var control strategy with solid state transformers (SST) 
for var compensation and voltage regulators for voltage regulation where the final objective is to 
minimize total system power loss while maintaining the voltage profile within the permissible 
limits in a distribution system. Distributed generation is taken into account while making an 
optimal capacitor control algorithm for getting the optimum set point in [27]. Different types of 






Figure 3 Divided Areas based on Reactive Power Domains [24] 
 
Both offline and online modes have some disadvantages. In offline mode, the control switches 
the capacitor bank according to some predefined time which may or may not relate with actual 
loading conditions because it has no feedback mechanism to monitor system conditions, so at 
low loading conditions the vars may be supplied and vice versa.  The online mode requires 
continuous monitoring of either the power factor of the total current supplied to the distribution 
system or some other quantity by some microprocessor-based relays due to the continuous 
change in loading conditions and intermittent DG penetration, if it is present, which can become 
expensive for getting really accurate measurements. Also, the computation becomes complex as 
the whole system has to be solved each time the var injections need to be calculated. Moreover, 
if there is any inconsistency present in the electrical design parameters of the distribution system 
while calculating the required var injections, or under cyber- attack conditions the capacitor 
control will become impractical. 
14 
 
2.2 Cyber Attacks in Power Systems 
With the rapidly increasing penetration of distributed generations (DG), the need for demand 
side management, and control of industrial and residential loads through demand response has 
led to the emergence of Distribution Management Systems (DMS) by electric utilities for better 
analysing and controlling the distribution systems. DMS rely heavily on the cutting edge 
communication technologies, advanced sensors, and other automated systems to achieve real-
time adjustment to changing loads, generation, and fiasco conditions of the distribution 
system.  Improving the reliability and quality of service, maintaining acceptable frequency 
and voltage levels in the distribution system usually without the operator intervention are the 
main functions of these systems. 
However, these advanced systems also craft new vulnerabilities in power infrastructures. 
Different types of attacks have been researched in the past for the smart grid’s automated control 
systems, wide area measurement and supervisory control and data acquisition systems.  For 
instance, in references [28-29] deception attacks and denial of service (DOS) attacks against a 
networked control system are defined. Deception attacks refer to the possibility of compromising 
the integrity of control packets or measurements, and they are cast by altering the behavior of 
sensors and actuators. Figure 4 shows the various points at where a cyber-attack can be done in a 
control system where A1 and A3 are the data integrity attacks, A5 is an attack on the physical 
system and A2 and A4 are attacks on the communication links connecting the physical system 




Figure 4 Cyber-Attack on Control System [29] 
 
Similarly, specific deception attacks in the context of static estimators through SCADA systems, 
known as false data injection attacks (FDIA) are described in [30-34].In FDIA an adversary aims 
to hack the readings of multiple sensors to mislead smart grid’s decision making process. 
Reference [30] shows modeling of a FDIA with incomplete knowledge of the power grid 
parameter and real time attributes such circuit breaker positions, tap positions of the voltage 
regulators, etc. It was proved that even if the attacker does not have access to full network 
information the attack can still bypass the bad data detection techniques of the state estimator. 
Also it has been shown in [32] that if the attacker knows the complete network conditions, the 
FDIA cannot be detected by the bad data detecting techniques used by the present state 
estimation systems. Reference [31] proposes a novel analytical method for doing the 
vulnerability analysis of state estimation when it is under FDIA on the SCADA system of an 
electric grid. Reference [34] also presents a deception attack on the state estimator through 
SCADA with a perturbed or outdated model of the electric grid. Both linear and non-linear state 
estimators are considered in this study. It was shown the more the accurate information the 
attacker possesses the greater the threat of a deception attack becomes. Figure 5 shows a 




Figure 5 Deception Attack on State Estimator in a Power Grid [34] 
 
Another subclass of the FDIA is load redistribution (LR) attack which has been recently studied 
in [35-37]. Reference [35] models a LR attack which is an attack on the smart meters of a smart 
grid changing the load at different buses in the system but maintaining the total load as it is. The 
effect of this attack on security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) has been discussed. Also 
it was proved that these LR attacks can bypass the bad detection schemes in if the network 
conditions are known. 
Reference [36] shows that an LR attack can be modeled which can bypass the bad data detection 
techniques presently available even under incomplete network information. Quantitative analysis 
of the damage that LR attacks can do to the power system operations and security is discussed in 
[37] and the prevention measures are also provided.  
The effects of data integrity cyber-attacks on the SCADA controlled voltage control loop of a 
transmission system is shown in [44].  The voltage control provided by FACT devices is 
targeted. The paper also explains by sensitivity analysis technique which device to attack to 
affect which bus. Figure 6 explains the schematic of a SCADA controlled voltage loop in a 
transmission system. Similarly the effect of cyber-attack on automatic generation control loop is 




Figure 6 SCADA Controlled Voltage Loop in a Transmission System [44] 
 
With numerous diverse imminent cyber threats to the automated control systems and state 
estimators of smart grids, the defensive mechanisms also have to build. Intuitively, there are two 
approaches to protecting control applications of power grid. The first is to design robust control 
algorithms that can detect or tolerate malicious data modification. The second is to protect the 
sensor measurements and other data from being manipulated.  
A lot of literature is available on the detection of cyber-attacks on state estimators through 
SCADA systems [38-40].  Reference [38] proses a method of cyber-attack detection taking the 
information from both the active power measurements and the reactive power measurements. It 
was observed that this strategy pin pointed the exact transmission lines attacked. In [39] authors 
propose a strategy of protecting a selected set of sensor measurements for detecting the attack by 
verifying somehow those set of measurements. Reference [40] describes s fully distributed 
procedure for the detection of cyber-physical attacks in power networks. In this study, the 
network is divided into different areas as shown in figure 7 and then each area is monitored and 
controlled by a local control center. A detection filter is designed based on sparse residual filter 




Figure 7 Detection of Cyber-Attack with Local Agents for each Area [40] 
 
References [41-42] propose physically protecting a certain number of the PMU out of the total 
which is a tough task. Reference [41] using graph algorithms provides with the minimum 
number of PMUs that need to be physically protected in order neutralize a cyber-attack. In [42] 
the problem of selecting the small subsets of measurements that can be made immune to make 
the whole system immune from data injection attack is solved. Since this problem becomes 
really complex because of the large size of the electrical grid, a fast greedy algorithm is used for 




Chapter 3: MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND 
FORMULATION 
 
3.1 Theory of Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) [48] 
Multiple linear regression (MLR) is a method used to model the linear relationship between a 
dependent variable and one or more predictor (independent) variables. The dependent variable 
can be load, voltage per unit, transmission loss function, etc., and the independent variables are 
the variables affecting these dependent variables in any way. The regression model expresses the 
value of a dependent variable as a linear function of one or more predictor variables and an error 
term. 
𝑌 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑋1 +⋯+ 𝑏𝑘𝑋𝑘 +  𝑒                                                                                               (1)                                                                                                         
Where, 𝑌 is the dependent variable, 𝑋1, 𝑋2,…., 𝑋𝑘 are the predictor variables, 𝑏1, 𝑏2,…., 𝑏𝑘 are 
regression parameters with respect to 𝑋1, 𝑋2,…., 𝑋𝑘, and 𝑒 is the error term. 
Let each of the 𝑘 predictor variables, 𝑋1, 𝑋2,…., 𝑋𝑘, have 𝑛 levels. The system of 𝑛 equations can 
be represented in matrix notation as follows: 





















1   𝑋11  𝑋12  … 𝑋1𝑘
1  𝑋21  𝑋22  …  𝑋2𝑘
…
…
































The matrix 𝐗  contains information about the levels of the predictor variables at which the 
observations are obtained. The vector 𝐛 contains all the regression coefficients. The difference 
between the actual value of 𝑌 and the predicted value ?̂? would, on average, tend toward 0, so it 
20 
 
can be assumed that the error term in equation (2) has an average value of 0. The error term can 
therefore be omitted in calculating parameters.  
The estimates of b are then obtained to get the regression model by using the least squares 
method such that the sum-of-squares of differences of observed and predicted values is 
minimized. The estimated b obtained is     
?̂? = (𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑌                                                                                                                            (3)                                                                                                                   
The multiple linear regression model also referred as fitted model can now be estimated as: 
?̂? =  ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑋1 +⋯+ ?̂?𝑘𝑋𝑘                                                                                                       (4)                                                                                                         
Or in matrix notation:  ?̂? = 𝑋?̂?                                                                                                     (5)                                                                                                  
The observations, 𝑌𝑖, may be different from the fitted values ?̂?𝑖 obtained from this model. The 
difference between these two values is the residual, ?̂?𝑖. The vector of residuals, ?̂?, is obtained as: 
?̂? = 𝑌 − ?̂?                                                                                                                                     (6)                                                                                                                      
The regression equation is estimated such that the total sum-of-squares can be partitioned into 
components due to regression and residuals: 
𝑆𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸                                                                                                                        (7)                                                                                                            
Where  
 𝑆𝑆𝐸 =  ∑ (𝑌𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
2           sum of squares, error 
𝑆𝑆𝑇 =  ∑ (𝑌𝑖 − ?̅?
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
2             sum of squares, total 
𝑆𝑆𝑅 =  ∑ (?̂?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − ?̅?)
2              sum of squares, regression 
?̅? : average value of 𝑌𝑖 
The explanatory power of the regression is explained by its 𝑅2 value, calculated from the sums-






= 1 − 
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝑆𝑆𝑇
   ϵ [0,1]                                                                                                        (8)                                                                                                 
The residual mean square (MSE) is the sample estimate of the variance of the regression 
residuals. 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 =  
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝑛−𝑘−1
                                                                                                                               (9)                                                                                                                           
The 𝑅2 value and 𝑀𝑆𝐸 value are the two goodness of fit of measurements which explains how 
well the predictor variables explain the dependent variable. The closer the 𝑅2 value is to 1 and 
the smaller the 𝑀𝑆𝐸 value, the better the estimated regression function fits the data. 
 
3.2 Modeling attacks and anomalies  
There are two attacks considered here the data integrity and LR attack as well as inconsistencies 
in electrical design parameters. This section models both the attacks and parameter 
inconsistencies. 
3.2.1 Inconsistencies in electrical design parameters 
A distribution system model has many parameters which define it completely like line resistance 
(R), line reactance (X), line geometry, conductor type, regulators type, etc. Any incorrect or 
uninformed parameter will lead to model errors and hence risk of operation of the entire system. 
Here inconsistencies are modeled as statistical variations with probabilities such as for example a 
variation δX in a distribution line L with reactance X. 
 3.2.2 Data integrity attack [29] 
This attack often requires detailed knowledge of the communication protocols to send false or 
malicious status or control signals. [44] presents a data integrity attack on control signals of  
voltage control of FACTs devices and substation controllers. Similar attack on a voltage control 




If u(t) is the actual signal from the control center and [umin (t), umax (t)] is the range of possible 
control signals. Let us define “Min attack” as an attack where u(t) = umin (t) for t ∈  τa the 
duration of attack and a “Max attack” as an attack where u(t) = umax (t). Such a min-max attack 
is unobservable as presented in [29] and its effect is more profound in the region near the impact. 
3.2.3 Load redistribution attack  
This attack is a subclass of false data injection attack where the load changes by L + △ L at some 
buses and L - △ L at other buses while the total load remains unchanged. It is assumed here that 
only load bus power injection measurements and line power flow measurements can be attacked 
and that physically protecting all the meters is not feasible. Also it has been proved theoretically 
in [35] that LR attacks cannot be detected by any of the existing techniques for bad data 
detection in a state estimator. However, since short-term load forecasting provides an 
approximate estimation of the load, an attack that results in larger △ L may be detected so for an 
undetectable attack, τ < 0.5 L and ∑𝐿 +△ 𝐿= L where τ is the load multiplier. So in our work, 
we suppose that the attack magnitude for a load measurement does not exceed τ = 50% of its true 
load value. 
The essential conditions for creating undetectable load redistribution (LR) attacks are proposed 
in [35]. For an undetectable load redistribution attack the total loading in the system should 
remain the same i.e. ∑ 𝐿 +△ 𝐿= L. It is also essential that the change in load at each node should 









3.3 Distributed Cyber Attack Detection Method 
Consider a power system with a set of buses 𝜆, a set of buses L ⊂ 𝜆 with known demand, a set of 
buses S ⊂ 𝜆 with solar generating units and a bus C ⊂  𝜆 with a capacitor unit. Let the voltage of 
a bus j 𝜖 J a set of {1, 2,…, 𝜆} buses, be given by 𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑗 where each element is a k-dimensional 






𝑖=1 + 𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑖 +⋯+ 𝑉𝑝𝑢ℎ𝑖)                                                                   (10)                                                            
Cluster set S = { 𝑆1, 𝑆2,….., 𝑆𝑡} are assigned to datapoints where 𝑆𝑖 is the set of observations { 
𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑎, 𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑏,….., 𝑉𝑝𝑢ℎ} and h ⊂ 𝜆. 
An agent 𝐴𝑗 from a cluster 𝑆𝑗 is 
 min𝑖 ∑ |(𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑗 − 𝑉𝑝𝑢µ𝑖)|
𝑘
𝑖=1   ⩝ 𝑗 = 𝑎, 𝑏, … , ℎ                                                                          (11)                   
From a highly correlated set of agents  𝐴𝑖 and 𝐴𝑗 an agent pair is created where 𝐴𝑗  𝜖 𝑆𝑗 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝜖 𝑆𝑖 
= ϕ and 𝑆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑗 ⊂ S. Consider the behavior of agent 𝐴𝑖 on 𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑗 as a regressive model given 
by eq. (12).  
𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑚(𝑘) =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑛(𝑘) + 𝑒1(𝑘)                                                                                    (12) 
The calculation of the coefficients 𝑏𝑖 result in eq. (13) 
?̂?𝑝𝑢𝑚 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑛                                                                                                              (13)                                                                  
Similarly, the statistical relationships between all the selected agent pairs are declared as shown 
in figure 3. A distribution network under cyber-attack with the bus voltages of the elected pair is 
compared to corresponding bus voltages in (13) obtained from the same network. If the variation 
exceeds a certain limit, the agent declares a cyber-attack event. A consensus of at least two agent 






3.4 Proposed Voltage Controller Methodology 
Consider a power system with a set of buses 𝜆, a set of buses L ⊂ 𝜆 with known demand, a set of 
buses S ⊂ 𝜆 with solar generating units and a bus C ⊂  𝜆 with a capacitor unit. Let total 
combined real power demand at buses 𝐿 be 𝑑, the real power generated at bus 𝑆 be p, the total 
kVars injected by the capacitor at bus 𝐶 be Kvar, and the voltage per unit at a bus 𝑗 from set 𝜆 is 
𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑗. The variables of total loading of the system, the real power output of the DG connected 
and the reactive power of the capacitor having a correlation with node voltage j are chosen as 
predictor variables. The dependent variable is the voltage in p.u. (Vpu) at any bus j violating 
voltage limits.  
A statistical model of dependent variable, with defined predictor variables is given by eq. (14). 
𝑉𝑝𝑢𝑗(𝑘) =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑑(𝑘) + 𝑏2𝑝(𝑘) + 𝑏3𝐾𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑘) + 𝑒(𝑘)                                                       (14)  
A calculation of coefficients of 𝑏𝑖 yields eq. (15) for Vpu of a bus j which is further used for 
voltage control. 
?̂?𝑝𝑢𝑗 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1 𝑑 + ?̂?2𝑝 + ?̂?3𝐾𝑣𝑎𝑟                                                                                        (15)                                                                                                         
Similarly, statistical models are developed for all the buses prone to voltage violations in the 
distribution system. Once the statistical models are obtained from Minitab software for the 
chosen distribution system, statistical reactive power model algorithm for calculation of kVars 
required to bring the voltage of the violated buses within the permissible limits is developed in 
Matlab. The inputs for the Kvar calculation model are the statistical models from eq. (15) and the 
required voltage at the violated bus and the output is the estimated kVars required to correct the 
voltage violations in that bus as shown in figure 8. 
The estimated kVars obtained from this algorithm is not affected by data injection attacks till the 
network topology changes as the statistical models from eq. (15) are obtained from validated 


















Chapter 4: SIMULATION TOOLS AND SOFTWARE 
 
This chapter briefly describes various software packages used in this thesis for modeling 
the electric distribution system, to make the voltage controller models and study their effects 
under different abnormal conditions and cyber-attack detection models. 
Out of the various commercially available simulation tools for modeling utility distribution 
systems we chose OpenDSS for doing distribution power flow in this thesis. The other software 
tools were CYMDIST, Milsoft, Windmil, etc. The voltage controller models are developed in 
MATLAB with the distribution network of OpenDSS being interfaced with it through COM 
Interface.   
The multiple linear regressions among the chosen dependent and independent variables for 
developing the voltage controller models and cyber-attack detection models are made in Minitab 
software. Other software used for doing regression analysis is STATA, data analysis package of 
MS Excel, etc. but we chose Minitab for its excellent representation of the results. The tools used 
in this research work are described with their abilities and their detailed importance in the 
following sections. 
4.1 Open Distribution System Simulator (OpenDSS) 
The Open Distribution System Simulator (OpenDSS or simply DSS) is an all-inclusive electrical 
system simulation tool for electric utility distribution systems. OpenDSS is open source software 
developed by the Electric Power Research Institute [45]. It can be used to steady state analysis, 
integration of distributed generation and time series power flow. It has also developed various 
test cases for all IEEE benchmark test feeders starting from IEEE 4 node to IEEE 8500 node test 
feeders. It provides two implementations; first one is a standalone executable platform and the 
other one is through COM server DLL, which can be used to drive OpenDSS from a myriad of 
other platforms. The executable version makes use of basic direct script codes through which 
user can develop circuits and solve them. The COM interface enables the user to drive OpenDSS 
externally from any third party analysis programs like MATLAB, VBA, C#, Pyhton etc. and 
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execute custom solution modes and features of the simulator. The DSS is designed in such a way 
so that it can to be effortlessly altered to meet future needs. 
The OpenDSS program can be used for the following applications [45]: 
• Distribution Planning and Analysis 
• General Multi-phase AC Circuit Analysis 
• Analysis of Distributed Generation Interconnections 
• Annual Load and Generation Simulations 
• Risk-based Distribution Planning Studies 
• Neutral-to-earth Voltage Simulations 
• Solar PV System Simulation 
• Wind Plant Simulations 
• Storage Modeling 
• Distribution Feeder Simulation with AMI Data 
• Distribution State Estimation 
• EV Impacts Simulations 
• Analysis of Unusual Transformer Configurations 
 
OpenDSS configuration is shown in figure 9 [46] which show the three different ways by which 
the DSS engine can be initiated. 
• OpenDSS scripts – Using direct scripting codes to define the circuit and solve it.  
• COM interface – Driving it externally from any third party analysis program. 




Figure 9 OpenDSS Configuration [46] 
 
Some of the special features of OpenDSS used in this work are listed below. 
4.1.1 Extensive Range of Solution Modes 
A number of solution applications are available in OpenDSS. OpenDSS can solve a basic power 
flow for a distribution system in which the substation is modeled as an infinite source of energy. 
The two methods used to solve power flow in DSS are the iterative and direct power flow 
methods. For iterative power flow method, the loads and distributed generators are modeled as 
injection sources. The algorithms used to solve power flow problem are the normal current 
injection and Newton current injection. For the direct mode, the loads and generators are 
included in system admittance matrix as admittances and this mode is solved directly without 
any iteration. 
DSS can solve both the meshed systems and radial systems with equal ease. The snapshot power 
flow mode does a single power flow solution at the current load. Similarly, daily, yearly and duty 
cycle power flow mode are also available for simulations of different periods. User specified 
load shape or a default load shape by the engine can be used for a daily, yearly or duty cycle 












After solving the power flows, losses, voltages, currents and other data are accessible for the 
feeder system.  The losses in terms of kW or kVar losses for each time instant for all the zones 
and loads are provided by the energy meters. A three phase unbalanced distribution power flow 
for the AEP feeder is performed using OpenDSS in this thesis. Also a PV unit and a capacitor 
bank are connected for the calculation of voltage controller in OpenDSS and the power flows are 
calculated. 
4.1.2 COM Interface 
The most useful feature of OpenDSS is the COM interface which allows user to execute custom 
solutions modes from an external platform and drive the DSS simulator from that platform and 
perform various analyses that cannot be done using the direct script codes. The third party 
programs are MS Office tool through VBA, MATLAB, Python, C# etc. Also through COM 
interface user can do solve loops like for, if, if then else etc. which are not available in the direct 
scripts in DSS. Most of the results of the DSS engine can also be retrieved through the COM 
interface.  
This Interface is used to drive the OpenDSS through MATLAB and calculate the required kVars 
from the capacitor bank for different network conditions and line losses for different geometries 
in the distribution networks for the study in our thesis. 
4.2 Minitab 
Minitab is a statistics package developed at the Pennsylvania State University by researchers 
Barbara F. Ryan, Thomas A. Ryan, Jr., and Brian L. Joiner in 1972.  It can be used to do various 
types of regression analysis like linear regression, non-linear regression, and orthogonal 
regression. It is also used for doing time series plots, developing ANOVA tables, correlation 
analysis, cascading of graphs and various other functions. 
Minitab is used in our thesis to do the regression analysis for the voltage controller models and 





Chapter 5: SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter discusses all the results of this research by introducing the test systems used 
and the algorithms simulated on these test systems. Also, the behavior of the test systems are 
studied through voltage and loss analysis results. Interpretations are drawn from these resultant 
plots to back the proposed ideas and goals of this thesis work. 
5.1 13-Bus Distribution System 
A 13-bus distribution system, shown in figure 10, is used to illustrate the proposed voltage 
controller based on MLR technique. System parameters include: 
• total load of 3466 kW and 2102 kvar 
• two 600-kvar capacitor banks (bus 675 and bus 611) 
 
Figure 10 IEEE 13 Bus Distribution Test Feeder 
The regulator controls are turned off to enhance the effects the capacitor control, and a 3-phase 
solar generating unit is added at bus 632. Power flow is run on the system for different loading 
and DG power output. Voltages of two buses, bus 652 and bus 684 violated the permissible 
limits. A 2-phase capacitor is added at bus 684 which is a logical choice as the bus 684 violated 
the voltage limits. Regression models are developed, taking the voltage in p.u.at each bus as the 
dependent variable in each model.  A data set of 36 observations is generated with the OpenDSS 
for some randomly selected values of predictor variables and the correspondingly obtained 
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dependent variable. The models are regressed and the coefficient of determination 𝑅2, and the 
mean squared error 𝑀𝑆𝐸 are calculated.  
Table 1 show the regression models obtained for bus 652 and 684 and their corresponding 𝑅2 
and MSE values. It can be seen that R2 values are close to one and MSE values are close to zero 
for all the models showing a good fit and proving that the predictor variables are able to explain 
almost 100 % variations in the dependent variable. Moreover, the normal probability plot of the 
residual for the regression models shown in figure 11 also shows that most of the red points are 
clustered around blue line indicating that the error terms are approximately normal indicating the 
goodness of fit of all the models. 
Table 1. Regression Models for Voltage in p.u. for Buses 652 and 684 
Bus 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 Model 𝑹𝟐  𝑴𝑺𝑬  
652 1.014169 – 0.09631*𝑑 +5.62e-06*𝑝 + 6.77e-05*𝐾𝑣𝑎𝑟 0.9957 2.79e-05 






























Vpu at node 652
Vpu at node 684
 
Figure 11 Normal Probability Plots for the Regression Models for Buses 652 and 684 
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The Kvars calculation models (Model 2) developed in Matlab from the statistical reactive power 
model algorithm are validated for some random values of loading and real power output of the 
PV unit as shown in table 2. The Kvars calculated from Model 2 are compared with the Kvars 
obtained from a conventional capacitor controller (Model 1) in OpenDSS to bring the voltage in 
pu at the violating buses to 0.95 pu. It is observed that the Kvars values from both the models are 
really close. 
 





𝐕𝐩𝐮        
Required 
kVars (652) kVars (684) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
1.205 0 0.95 788 766.4 691 671.6 
1.401 8 0.95 1055 1044.6 942 934.4 
1.058 520 0.95 539 514.1 456 431.6 
1.208 480 0.95 752 730.8 655 636.5 
1.352 120 0.95 978 965.5 870 859.4 
0.975 0 0.95 468 439.2 391 362.4 
 
Simulation results on a real-world, large-scale distribution system is presented next. The 
accuracy of the proposed voltage controller based on MLR technique is demonstrated, its 
robustness with inconsistencies in electrical design parameters and cyber-attack conditions is 
also shown. The accuracy of the proposed distributed cyber-attack detection technique is also 
validated for both the cyber-attacks. Specifically, this section will present the following: 
5.2 AEP Test Circuit  
In previous research work co-authors [47] have modeled AEP system and studied impact of PV 
penetration. The AEP feeder I, shown in figure 12, is radial 395 buses system and is fed by a 
12.47 KV medium voltage substation modeled as a voltage source behind impedance. The 
distribution system includes two main circuits with laterals and distributed loads. The aggregated 
loads represent a mixture of residential and industrial loads and the total load on the system is 
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2.27 MVA (2.042 MW and 1.00 MVAR) and the active power losses represent 1.52 % of the 
total system load. The load buses in this system are modeled as PQ loads. Three voltage 
regulators (two 3-phases and one single phase) employed in this feeder are turned off. A 3-phase 
solar power generating unit is added at bus 43_west and a 1-phase capacitor is added at bus 
131_west.3. 
 
Figure 12 AEP Feeder 1 Network Diagram 
 
5.2.1 MLR based Statistical Voltage Controller 
A an unbalanced three-phase power flow (UTDPF) is performed to obtain voltage profile of the 
distribution system. The active power generation of the renewable generators in the system is 
increased according to their daily generation curve and a power flow solution is again performed 
to obtain the voltages of the buses. Starting from the substation the sections where the voltage is 
most frequently violated for different network conditions are identified. These sections also form 
a logical choice for location of capacitors. With variations in active power generation, four buses 
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164_west, 146_west, 143_west and 132_west have the most voltage violations and are therefore 
considered as dependent variables. The predictor variables here are the kVars from the 
capacitors, active power output of PV, the total loading and the models are defined in table 3. 
The coefficient of determination (𝑅2) and the mean squared error (MSE) as well as the plot of 
the residual of datapoints vs the model show the accuracy of the models.  
It can be seen from table 3 that 𝐑𝟐 values are close to one and MSE values are close to zero for 
all the models showing a good fit and proving that the predictor variables are able to explain 
almost 100 % variations in the dependent variable. Figure 13 shows the normal probability plot 
of the residual for the regression models and indicated the goodness of fit of all the models. 
Table 3. Regression Models for Voltage in p.u. for Buses 164_west, 146_west, 143_west and 
132_west. 
Bus Regression Model 𝐑𝟐  𝐌𝐒𝐄 
164_west 1.021319 – 0.09819*𝑑 +1.13e-05*𝑝 + 0.000202*𝐾𝑣𝑎𝑟 0.9995 5.2e-07 
143_west 1.021469 – 0.09569*𝑑 +1.13e-05*𝑝 + 0.000202*𝐾𝑣𝑎𝑟 0.9994 6.25e-07 
146_west 1.021413 – 0.0971*𝑑 +1.13e-05*𝑝 + 0.000202*𝐾𝑣𝑎𝑟 0.9995 5.53e-07 




























































Vpu at node 164_WEST Vpu at node 143_WEST
Vpu at node 146_WEST Vpu at node 132_WEST
 
Figure 13 Normal Probability Plots for the Regression Models for Buses 164_west, 
146_west, 143_west and 132_west 
  
The reactive power outputs from the regressive model (Model 2) for a typical 24 hour load curve 
with a peak load of 1.42 KW are shown in figure 14. These reactive power requirements are 
compared with those obtained from a traditional capacitor control achieved in OpenDSS (Model 






Figure 14 Controller validation for the Kvar calculation models for buses 164_west, 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
1 85% 0% 234.5 232.7 219 217 227.5 225.7 198.5 196.5
2 85% 0% 234.5 232.7 219 217 227.5 225.7 198.5 196.5
3 85% 0% 237 235.1 221 219.4 230 228.1 201 198.8
4 86% 0% 244.5 242.4 228.5 226.5 237.5 235.3 208 205.6
5 99% 1% 332.5 327.6 314 309.5 324.5 319.6 290.5 285.5
6 100% 5% 341 335.5 322 317.2 332.5 327.4 298 292.8
7 95% 15% 302.5 299.1 280.5 281.6 295 291.3 262 258.3
8 95% 40% 289.5 286.3 271.5 269 281.5 278.6 249 245.6
9 91% 52% 261 259 244 242.2 253.5 251.5 222 219.5
10 85% 60% 215.5 214 199.5 198.3 208.5 207 179 177.1
11 79% 65% 175 173.4 160 158.7 168.5 166.9 141 138.9
12 79% 68% 174 172.4 159 157.7 167.5 165.9 140 137.9
13 75% 65% 140 139.4 126.5 125.6 134 133.2 108.5 107
14 63% 61% 66.5 62.5 54.5 50.6 61 57.2 39.5 35.1
15 56% 48% 20.5 14.8 10.5 4.3 16 10.1 0 0
16 55% 35% 20 14.3 10 4 15.5 9.7 0 0
17 49% 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 56% 1% 38 33 27.5 22.5 33.5 28.3 14 9.3
19 56% 0% 38.5 33.4 28 22.8 34 28.6 14.5 9.7
20 69% 0% 123 120.9 110 108.1 117.5 115.1 94 91.7
21 54% 0% 26.5 21.2 16.5 11 22 16.6 3.5 0
22 80% 0% 199.5 197.7 184.5 182.9 192.5 191.1 165.5 163.7
23 88% 0% 260 257.5 243.5 241.2 252.5 250.2 222 219.8
24 96% 0% 311 307 293 289.5 303 299.3 270 266.2
Kvar (164_WEST) Kvar (143_WEST) Kvar (146_WEST) Kvar (132_WEST)
Hours Load PV Power Output
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5.2.2 MLR based Controller Performance  
In this section, the MLR controller is tested for model consistencies and cyber-attacks. Controller 
performance under model inconsistency in line of increase in reactance from 1.79 pu to 3.79 pu 
is considered. Also deception attack is simulated by manipulating the reactive power injection 
control signal of the capacitor at 131_west from 150 kVar to 300 kVar (50%). An LR attack is 
simulated by manipulating the load value at 644_7231501-1 from 75 kW to 150 kW and 
decreasing the load value at 382_7231503-1 from 22.5 kW to 147.5 kW. It should be noted that 
these events are not simulated simultaneously. 
Line Geometry (an example to show the effect of inconsistency of electrical design parameters) 
AEP feeder 1 has both overhead lines and underground cables giving away the line losses, but 
the considerable amount of the losses are given by the overhead lines. Overhead lines have 3 
different types of lines having different types of geometries, 2 conductor type, 3 conductor type 
and 4 conductor type. The 2 conductor type and 4 conductor types, having 17 and 14 different 
types of line geometries present respectively, are the maximum losses giving lines. For this 
work, a unity load is taken and no DG is added to the system.  
Figure 15 and 16 show the losses on four separate, maximum losses giving lines of a 2 conductor 
type line and 4 conductor type lines, respectively. The bars with white dots are the lines losses 
with their original line geometry whereas the remaining of the bars for that line is when other 
line geometries are used to calculate the losses in those lines. It is observed that line losses are 
dissimilar for different line geometries used for a same line and this type of inconsistency of an 
electrical design parameter can result in a catastrophe if we use the results of these for solving 




Figure 15 Losses in Four Maximum Losses giving Lines with Each Type of Line Geometry 
for 2-Conductor Type Line 
 
 
Figure 16 Losses in Four Maximum Losses giving Lines with Each Type of Line Geometry 














































Figure 17 Controller Testing for the Voltage Controllers against Electrical Design 
Parameter Inconsistencies, Deception Attack and LR Attack 
The predictor variables are plotted as shown in figure 17 for a 24 hour period under conventional 
capacitor control (Model 1), MLR base voltage controller (Model 2), conventional capacitor 
control with inconsistency in reactance (Model 3), conventional capacitor control with deception 
attack (Model 4), and conventional capacitor control with LR attack (Model 5) for a 24 hour 
period with the load and solar generation output curve as given in figure 14. It is observed that 
voltage in pu calculated from conventional voltage control with inconsistency, deception attack 
and LR attack have a high deviation from the controller without any abnormality. Moreover, it 
can be seen that Model 1 and Model 2 maintain the voltage in pu within the permissible range 
whereas in Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5, the controllers fail to maintain the voltage in pu 
within the permissible limits for certain hours in a 24 hours period during which the system 
operations might get disturbed. 
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5.2.3 Cyber Attack Distributed Detection Method 
Unbalanced three-phase distribution power flow solutions are obtained for AEP distribution 
system under 25 different network conditions. Data sets of voltage in pu for all the buses in the 
system are calculated using OpenDSS. As discussed in section 3.3 four clusters sets are formed 
as shown in figure 18 and six agent pairs are identified. These data sets are divided into different 
clusters using the k-means clustering method done in Matlab. Only four clusters are made as 
with increase in number of clusters the separation between them decreases and decreasing the 
number of clusters results in fewer agents. It can be observed from the silhouette plot in the 
figure 18, that most points in the first, third and fourth cluster have a large silhouette value, 
greater than 0.8, indicating that these clusters are somewhat separated from neighboring clusters. 
However, the second cluster contains many points with low silhouette values with negative 
values also, indicating that this cluster is not well separated.  
Models based on MLR obtained for the agent pairs are defined in table 4. The coefficient of 
correlation is greater than 0.98 and MSE close to zero show good fit and also the agent pairs 
belong to different cluster sets. Figure 19 shows the normal probability plot of the residual for 
the statistical models for attack detection and indicate the goodness of fit of all the models. 
The total number of buses, the centroid value and the two elected buses based on the lowest sum 
of absolute values are shown in table 5 for each cluster. Total six elected pairs are identified from 
the whole network. Linear regression analysis is done on the elected pairs in Minitab software to 





Figure 18 Cluster Division for AEP Feeder 1 Network  
 























Figure 9 Normal Probability Plots for the Regression Models of the Agents 
 
The cyber-attack distributed detection method is tested against deception attack and LR attack on 
the AEP Feeder 1 with different attack scenarios constructed in OpenDSS. 
1. Deception Attack 
Scenario 1: No attack 
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Scenario 2: Increase in var injection of capacitor at 131_west from 150 kVar to 300 kVar (50%) 
Scenario 3: Decrease in var injection of capacitor at 131_west from 150 kVar to 75 kVar (50%) 
Scenario 4: Increase in var injection of capacitor at 131_west from 150 kVar to 180 kVar (20%) 
2. Load Redistribution Attack 
Scenario 1: No attack 
Scenario 2: Increase in load 644_7231501-1 from 75 kW to150 kW and decrease in load 
382_7231503-1 from 222.5 kW to 147.5 kW  
Scenario 3: Increase in load 25_7231504-1 from 160 kW to 270 kW and decrease in load 
382_7231503-1from 222.5 kW to 112.5 kW 
Scenario 4: Decrease in load 331_7231503-1 from 115 kW to 60 kW and increase in load 
322_7231503-1 from 75 kW to130 kW 
Figure 20 and figure 21 show the local decision by each agent and the final decision for the 
scenarios presented above for deception attack and load redistribution attack respectively. Here, 
the green blocks indicate “no cyber-attack” decision whereas red blocks indicate “cyber-attack” 
decision provided by the agents. It is observed that the proposed detection method provide 
accurate decision for all the scenarios for both the attacks. It is inferred that for the deception 
attack case, most of the agents detect the attack as the effect of the change in the var injection by 
the capacitor causes significant effect on the per unit voltages in the system. Whereas for the LR 
attack case, comparatively fewer agents detect the attack, as the individual loads that are 
modified by the attack has insignificant value when compared to the total load of the system in 





Figure 20 Decision Table for Deception Attack 
 













Chapter 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, a novel multiple linear regression based method to control the bus voltages 
in a distribution system with renewable sources is proposed.  A statistical distributed detection 
technique based on local decision making agents is proposed and validated. These proposed 
methods are demonstrated on a real world distribution system feeder, AEP system Feeder 1 
modelled in OpenDSS whereas the regression modellings are done in Minitab software. The 
conclusions drawn from both these works have been presented in this section. 
6.1.1 Voltage Controller Strategy 
In this thesis, a robust and reliable voltage controller based on multiple linear regressions to 
maintain the voltage profile in a distribution system with distributed generators (DG) connected 
to it is developed. The proposed controller is validated on IEEE 13 bus distribution system and 
American Electric Power System feeder modeled in OpenDSS.  
The results showed that the developed strategy for voltage control involve exact network 
simulations initially, but once the models are designed no further calculations are required unless 
the network topology changes. Also the effectiveness of the proposed method is shown in the 
presence of inconsistencies in electrical design parameters, data integrity attacks and LR attacks 
which make them a viable alternative to the conventional capacitor controller.  
6.1.2 Distributed cyber-attack detection technique 
A regression based distributed detection algorithm having local detection agents is developed for 
detection of cyber-attack in a distribution system with DG connected to it. An algorithm is 
developed to select a certain number of buses in the system to be declared as elected buses pairs 
and linear regression based local agents are developed from the elected pairs of buses. The 




The results showed that the developed technique for cyber-attack detection involve exact 
network simulations initially, but once the methods are designed no further calculations are 
required unless the network topology changes. The elected buses for developing the agents being 
distributed sparsely along the feeder and having really high correlation among them detected all 
the attack scenarios with accurate precision.   
6.2 Future Work 
Voltage control and cyber-attack detection techniques in the present smart grid depend on the 
real time data communication and validation of the variables affecting them respectively in a 
distribution system. Also the frequently changing topology of the distribution system should be 
accurately modeled and in a quick span of time for a better and accurate assessment. 
For our study, the variations of the tap settings of the voltage regulators can be included in the 
regression analysis when forming the statistical models for voltage control and attack detection. 
Also if there is some provision of updating these models after some specified interval of time or 
after some change in the topology in the distribution system is detected then these statistical 
models can be applied to the real world. The number of chosen buses can be increased to 
increase the total agents in the distribution system for further increasing the accuracy for 
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